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Book Review
By Julius G.
Getman, Stephen B. Goldberg and Jeanne B. Herman. New York, N.Y.:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1976. Pp. xvii, 218. $7.50.
UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY.

The union representation election is the cornerstone of the National
Labor Relations Act. The Act gives workers the right to choose, through
independently administered elections, whether or not they want a union to
represent them in negotiations with their employer. The representation
election, however, is more than either a mechanism for establishing unions
or a determinant of union growth. It is a symbolic event in which the confrontation tension between unions and employers is heightened and the tone
is set for collective bargaining. Not surprisingly, many students of labor law
and industrial relations have studied representation elections and the efficacy
of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rules governing the conduct of
unions and employers in such elections.
The popularity of this subject notwithstanding, Union Representation
Elections: Law and Reality is an important contribution to the literature.
This work, by two legal scholars and a psychologist,' is the first to test in a
direct, systematic fashion the assumptions which underlie NLRB policies.
Fortuitously, the book appears at a time when an increasing number of
people are questioning the benefits and effectiveness of law in regulating
economic conduct.
According to the authors, the regulations governing representation elections rest on several assumptions 2 developed through many years of NLRB
decisionmaking, but previously unverified by empirical research:
1. Employees are attentive to an election campaign. 3
2. Employees will interpret ambiguous statements by employers as
threats or promises.'

1. Julius G. Getman is a Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law; Stephen B.
Goldberg holds the same position at Northwestern University School of Law; Jeanne B. Herman is an Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior at the Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.
2. Since the NLRB has frequently drawn a parallel between representation elections and
political elections, some of these assumptions may have been borrowed from electoral politics.
Of the assumptions which follow, one, three, and four seem particularly applicable to the premises on which political campaigns are based.
3.

J.

GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG &

J.

HERMAN, UNION

AND REAITy 8 (1976).
4. Id. at 9.
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3. Employees are generally unsophisticated about labor relations. 5
4. The free choice of employees is fragile and may be stifled by unfair
6
campaign tactics.
5. Employees must be granted an opportunity to campaign for the union
on company premises to communicate as effectively with employees
7
as does the employer.
6. The signing of authorization cards is an indication of employee
choice."
To test the validity of these assumptions, thirty-one single-union election
cases 9 were studied during the period from February 1972 to September
1973. Cases were selected prior to an election and were chosen so is to
ensure diversity in such factors as location of the company,' 0 type of industry, company size, and identity of the organizing union. Each of the thirtyone cases, however, shared one important characteristic. The authors
selected only those cases that had a better than average chance of producing
a hotly contested election resulting in the use of illegal campaign tactics."
An important part of the book is the description of the methodology of
the data collection process. After an election had been selected for study,
the employees were interviewed to determine their predispositions toward
unionization. 1 2 Specific questions in this first interview involved employee
attitudes toward working conditions and unions, and voting preferences.
Immediately after the election, a second interview was conducted to deter-

5. Id. at 11.
6. Id. at 13.
7. Id. at 19.
8. Id. at 20. An authorization card, when signed by the employee, is an indication of
employee intent to be represented by a union in the collective bargaining process. When a
union petitions the NLRB to hold an election, it submits these cards along with the petition to
satisfy a NLRB rule that the petition must have the support of 30% or more of the employees.
9. The authors believed that the results of this study would be significantly affected by
inter-union campaigning and, therefore, elections involving more than one union were screened
out.

10. Because of the expense involved in a nationwide survey, the study was limited to the
Midwestern States.
11. Since unlawful campaigning occurred in 22 of the 31 elections, the authors were apparently successful in obtaining the type of elections they were seeking.
12. The authors encountered substantial resistance in seeking the names and addresses of
the employees entitled to vote in a particular election. After the NLRB refused to release this
data on the grounds that employee interviews would interfere with their freedom of choice, the
authors sued the NLRB under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975). Almost two years after their initial request, the NLRB was ordered to release the
employee lists. Cetman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The resulting volume shows that the Board was overly protective. As exemplified by this
study, a carefully written, extensively tested, and professionally administered interview will
produce valid information without compromising employee rights.
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mine whether there had been any change in attitude towards employers and
unions. More importantly, the employees were asked how they voted in the
election. With some persistence by the interviewer, over 90% of the 1,239
employees interviewed disclosed their vote.' 3
The significant findings of the report are:
1. "[E]mployees have strong and stable predispositions to vote for or
against union representation." 14
2. "There was no evidence that any individual campaign issue was particularly effective in influencing employees to vote for the party raising that issue."15
3. "Potential union voters did not vote against union representation in
significantly greater numbers in bargaining order elections [i.e., those
with discovered illegal campaigns] than in clean elections or elections
6
characterized by lesser unlawful campaigning." 1
4. None of the presumably illegal tactics-threats of reprisals, promises
of benefits, selective discharge of union sympathizers, or
17
interrogation--caused workers to switch their preferences.
These findings and the evidence on which they are based lead the authors to
recommend that written and oral communications made during representation campaigns be freed of governmental restraint.',
As a frontal assault on long-standing NLRB policies, this book will unquestionably receive scrupulous examination by social scientists, legal schol13. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 42.
14. Id. at 72.
15. Id. at 109.
16. Id. at 129.
17. Id. at 128-29, 141.
18. Such an alternative approach to NLRB election regulation is described in the concluding
chapter. Id. at 139-63.
The NLRB has recently taken a significant step towards deregulating union representation
campaigns in Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705
(April 8, 1977). In a 3-2 decision, the Board overruled the landmark case of Hollywood
Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962), and held that "we will no longer
set elections aside on the basis of misleading campaign statements." 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708. The
Getman study was discussed extensively in the opinion and formed the basis for the Board's
conclusion. In reference to the previous NLRB assumptions, now partially undermined by the
current study, the Board observed:
[O]ur fundamental disagreement with past Board regulation in this area lies in our
unwillingness to embrace the completely unverified assumption that misleading
campaign propaganda will interfere with employees' freedom of choice. Implicit in
such an assumption is a view of employees as naive and unworldly whose decision
on as critical an issue as union representation is easily altered by the self-serving
campaign claims of the parties .... We decline to join those who would continue to
regulate on the basis of such assumptions .... Rather, we believe the Board rules
in this area must be based on a view of employees as mature individuals who are
capable of recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and discounting it.
Id. at 1707.
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ars, and advocates. Two issues will be the subject of the most extensive
inspection: first, whether the study in fact accurately isolates and measures
what it purports to measure; and second, whether one can confidently derive generalized conclusions about the nature of employee voting behavior
from these findings.
When judged against the standard research practices employed by social
and behavioral scientists, this reviewer finds little reason to doubt the accuracy of the obtained results. The "before and after" interview approach,
while it has its methodological limitations, is an effective method of isolating
the relationship between voting and campaigning. Moreover, the authors
have been careful not to dispute the validity of the Board's assumptions
without substantial data proving the contrary. Readers trained in statistical
analysis might be concerned, however, about the authors' heavy reliance on
tabular and simple correlation analysis techniques. Although multiple correlations would have made the findings even more conclusive, it is doubtful
that the accuracy of the results would have been significantly affected by
different modes of statistical analysis. The data supporting the authors' conclusions are simply too compelling.
While the findings of the study may be accurate, representation elections
should not be deregulated on the basis of this particular study alone. The
book's overall persuasiveness must be based on how well one can generalize
from the studied elections to all elections. In this regard, the study does
have limitations. First, there is more than a reasonable chance that the sample is not completely representative. Furthermore, the authors did not pay
particular attention to the motivations of employers and workers both prior
to and during the elections.
While the number of studied elections is exceedingly small, the size of
the sample is not necessarily determinative of its representative nature. The
issue is whether these thirty-one elections are representative of all
elections-those occurring during the period from which the sample is taken
and those likely to occur at a later time. Can one be sure that the economic
and industrial relations conditions of 1972 and 1973 (the period of analysis)
had no effect on worker attitudes or voting behavior? Will future economic
conditions affect voting behavior so as to invalidate the findings of this
study?
Regardless of future implications, it is questionable whether the study is
representative of other elections occurring during the same time period.
During the period from which the sample was chosen, the union victory rate
for all elections was 51.1% 19 and the rate for single-union elections, such as

19. FinalOutcome of Representation Elections in Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 1973 (table), 38

NLRB ANN. RPBo.
app. 231, at 232 (1973).
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those studied, was 49. 1%.20 In the thirty-one studied elections, however,
only 25.8% were won by unions. 21 This discrepancy between the sample
union victory rate and the overall union victory rate is not precluded by the
laws of probability and sampling. Nonetheless, further investigation is required to determine the cause of the discrepancy.
This low victory rate may be linked to some factors likely to play a role
in determining worker sensitivity to management's tactics. The authors state
that elections were selected because they showed signs of developing strong
campaigns and illegal campaign practices. Operationally, this makes considerable sense. In hindsight, perhaps a sample of elections in which minimal
or modest managerial resistance would be anticipated should also have been
studied. Could there be something unique about employers who strongly
resist union intervention and who run the risk of sanctions for illegal practices, however weak those sanctions may be? Why does an apparently rational employer go to the expense of conducting an illegal campaign when, if
the authors are correct, such practices have no impact on employee voting
behavior?
Consider the following hypothesis. Suppose a strongly anti-union
employer endeavors to keep his plant nonunion by employing only those
workers who are unlikely to vote for a union. Once the plant becomes the
focus of organizing efforts, however, the union is able to collect a sufficient
number of authorization cards. Employees may have signed these cards because: (1) they were momentarily dissatisfied with their job and working
conditions; (2) they were true union supporters and had not been screened
out in the employment process, as no selection practice is perfect; (3) they
signed the cards in the face of strong peer pressure; or (4) they were apathetic to the election and signed in order to be left alone. 22 Faced with this
showing of union sentiment, management launches an intensive campaign,
not because it feels that the union has strong support amont its workers but
as an insurance policy. Like a bowl of chicken soup, a strongly fought campaign may not do any good, but it won't do any harm either. Thus, by
selecting only hotly contested elections, the authors may have inadvertently
focused only upon the strongly anti-union, and thus nonrepresentative
employers.
Moreover, the authors may have narrowed their study to a particular
type of worker as well as a particular type of employer. The specific motivations of the workers in a particular election should have been researched
more thoroughly to determine what motivations affected voting behavior.
Although the present volume devotes a large section to a study of employee
20. Id. at 231.
21. See J. GzrM , S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 33.
22. See id. at 131.
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preferences, no set of determining influences was found. Not only were preferences unaffected by campaigns, but they failed to show a responsiyeness
to other factors as well. Before the authors can conclusively state that campaigns do not determine employee preferences, it should be discovered
what factors, if any, do influence voting behavior.
The authors' concentration on strongly anti-union employers may be significant for a different reason. In a regulated world, the decision to live close
to the rules is based in part on the costs of apprehension. Thus, the NLRB
rules and accompanying sanctions governing representation elections deter
some employers (presumably those less antagonistic to unions) from conducting vigorous campaigns. According to the authors, workers in the nondeterred cases, however, have anticipated the anti-union tactics of their
employers and have discounted them.'
But in a nonregulated world, fewer
mildly anti-union employers would be deterred from conducting a strong
campaign. Would workers still discount the tactics of these employers, who
might have greater credibility from the employee's viewpoint than a strongly
anti-union employer?
A representation election is a highly complex event. It deals with the
interests of three parties-workers, unions, and management. Moreover, an
election is only one occurrence in a long term relationship among the parties, reflecting the history of labor relations and influencing the future of
labor relations. Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality deals with
much of the complexity of representation elections through a well designed
research project. It is an important step towards systematic verification of
labor law policies, long in need of such research. But as an argument for
deregulating representation election campaigns, it overstates its case.
Through future replications of the study, giving greater attention to the
motivations of employers and the origin of worker sentiments, such a convincing argument may yet evolve.
MYRON RoOMKIN*

23. Id. at 129.
* Associate Professor of Industrial Relations at the Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.

